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INTRODUCTION 
A Norwegian County has ruled that smoking in the workplace is a 
basic human right, rejecting a ban introduced in one town on 
municipal employees . . . .   
 Since January 1, municipal employees in Levanger in central 
Norway had been banned from smoking during work hours, both on 
or off town property and even when they were on breaks, business 
trips abroad or traveling in their own cars on business. 
 Three members of Levanger’s city council appealed the 
municipal by-law and regional officials found that the by-law violated 
citizens’ right to a private life, as defined by the European Convention 
on Human Rights . . . . 
 The ruling came as the Scandinavian country prepares to impose 
a total ban on smoking in public places, including bars, restaurants 
and discos, on June 1 [2004].1 
 The above-noted news story highlights a problem that has plagued the institutions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights2 since its effective date in 1953:  What subject matter 
should fall within the meaning of “private life” under Article 8 of the Convention so as to be 
protected from unjustified governmental interference? 
 The European Court (and, previously, Commission)3 of Human Rights have failed, by 
certain commentators’ accounts, to provide sufficient guidance on the subject.  To some, the 
“Commission’s practice concerning the meaning of private life has been distinguished neither 
by its clarity nor its discipline,”4 others have called Article 8 “elusive,”5 and yet others have 
                                                
* B.A. 1993, J.D. 1997, University of Southern California; LL.M. candidate 2004, University of 
Oslo, Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law.  
1  Smoking a Basic Human Right, Norwegian County Rules, Agence France Presse (14 Apr. 2004) 
(emphasis added) (obtained from the Westlaw periodical database on 10 July 2004). 
2  The treaty is officially known as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and it became effective on 3 September 1953.  The Convention presently 
has 46 countries as contracting members. 
3  The Commission was abolished in November 1998. 
4  D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, and C. Warbrick, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS p. 305 (1995) [hereinafter Harris]. 
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simply remarked that the present state of affairs is due to the fact that defining “the notion of 
‘privacy’ or ‘private life’ . . . is very hard to do.”6  Much of the criticism has stemmed from 
the fact that the Convention institutions have taken a case-by-case approach to defining 
private life, rather than providing a general or exhaustive definition of the phrase. 
 Nevertheless, it can be gleaned from the case law that the European Court of Human 
Rights has been trying, particularly in the last seven years, to provide more guidance and 
perhaps even construct a general (albeit not exhaustive) definition.  I have in mind here 
several recent decisions of the Court that have referred to a person’s reasonable expectations 
of privacy as the possible standard.  This Paper will explore the development of this recent 
trend and propose the direction in which the Court should head in the years to come. 
 Part I of this Paper introduces the reader to Article 8 of the Convention.  I first discuss 
how the Court approaches an Article 8 complaint and then briefly describe the interpretive 
methods the Court employs in assessing it.  I next discuss how the Convention institutions 
have gradually sculpted the meaning of private life on a case-by-case basis.  The reader will 
learn that Strasbourg has essentially recognized two components of private life.  The first is a 
privacy component that governs the traditional idea that some matters should be kept secret or 
free from publicity, whereas the second “concerns a sphere within which everyone can freely 
pursue the development and fulfillment of his personality,”7 which I refer to as the personal 
choice component. 
 Part II discusses the emergence in 1997 of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test in 
some of the Court’s opinions as a means for determining whether the privacy component of 
private life has been implicated.  Five different opinions are discussed and critiqued, 
concluding with the Court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue in von Hannover v. 
Germany.8  I conclude that despite some early signs of trepidation (due, in my mind, to 
uncertainty on how to apply the test), the Court appears eager to pursue or at least explore 
reasonable expectations as the benchmark in future cases. 
 Part III concludes that although the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is only in 
its infancy at Strasbourg, the test provides a promising foundation for future analyses of 
whether private life is implicated.  I propose that the test should be further refined and 
expanded to include not only analysis of privacy component claims, but personal choice 
claims as well.  Private life cases should be analyzed with some species of the following 
principle:  A public authority may not without proper justification interfere with or fail to 
respect matters in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy or personal choice.  
The remaining sections of Part III suggest how the Court should apply such a test. 
                                                                                                                                                   
5  Luke Clements, Nuala Mole, and Alan Simmons, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE 
UNDER THE CONVENTION p. 176 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Clements]. 
6  J.G. Merrills and A.H. Robertson, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE p. 138 (4th ed. 2001). 
7  Ursula Kilkelly, THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE p. 11 (2001). 
8  No. 59320/00 (24 June 2004). 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 8 AND THE CONVENTION INSTITUTIONS’ DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE MEANING OF “PRIVATE LIFE” 
 Article 8 states in its entirety: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 Article 8 has been called “one of the most open-ended provisions of the Convention”9 
undoubtedly because none of its terms is further defined.  Despite the various opportunities 
for interpretation, this Paper is most concerned with the meaning of a single phrase: “private 
life.”10  Before proceeding to an analysis of that phrase, however, I think it is important first to 
discuss, by way of background, how the Court generally determines whether there has been a 
violation of Article 8 and the methods of interpretation the Court utilizes.  After painting this 
backdrop, I then summarize how the Convention tribunals have defined the meaning of 
“private life” through their case-by-case approach. 
A. The Court’s Approach to Finding a Violation of Article 8 
 The Court generally determines whether a violation under Article 8 has occurred by 
employing a three-step analysis.  First, the Court decides whether Article 8 is at all applicable 
by analyzing whether the case involves private life, family life, home or correspondence.  
This is the step that this Paper is most concerned with.  Second, if any one of the triggering 
rights is involved, the Court then moves on to decide whether a public authority has either 
interfered with that right or has failed to take steps to protect that right from interference by 
others.  Cases dealing with an interference by a public authority are said to invoke the 
negative obligation aspect of Article 8--i.e., the government must ordinarily refrain from 
interfering with a person’s rights--whereas the other class of cases are said to invoke the 
positive obligation aspect--i.e., sometimes the government must take positive steps, perhaps 
by creating other rights, to prevent others from interfering with a person’s rights under Article 
8.11  The hook for imposing negative obligations comes directly from paragraph 2, while 
                                                
9  Clare Ovey and Robin C.A. White, JACOBS & WHITE: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS p. 217 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Ovey]. 
10  Although the Convention uses the expression “private and family life,” the Convention 
institutions routinely split the phrase into “private life” and “family life.” 
11  The prototypical negative obligation case involves a police authority interfering with private life 
by using a covert listening device to obtain information from a suspect.  See, e.g., A. v. France, 
No. 14838/89, A-277-B, 17 EHRR 462 (23 Nov. 1993) (involving the recording of a telephone 
conversation).  An example of a positive obligation case may be found in Hatton et al. v. UK, No. 
36022/97, 34 EHRR 1 (2 Oct. 2001), where the applicant complained that the noise from 
Heathrow airport at night was interfering with his private and family life.  The Court explained: 
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positive obligations stem from the State’s duty under paragraph 1 to “respect” a person’s 
rights under Article 8.12 
 In the third step, the Court essentially asks whether the State’s acts or omissions are 
justified.  The route taken here depends on the nature of the alleged transgression.  In 
traditional negative obligation cases, the Court expressly relies on paragraph 2 and analyzes 
whether the government’s interference was (1) made in accordance with the laws of the State 
in question, (2) pursues one or more of the exhaustive, legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2, 
and (3) can be regarded as necessary in a democratic society to accomplish the aim(s) 
pursued.  In positive obligation cases, the analysis differs slightly because paragraph 2 is not 
by its own terms designed to address cases where the interference comes from someone other 
than a public authority.  Indeed, early case law suggested that a violation of a positive 
obligation under Article 8(1) could be found “without there being any call to examine it under 
paragraph 2.”13  Nowadays, however, the Court employs a balancing test that uses the aims in 
paragraph 2 as a non-exhaustive guide and measures “the competing interests of the 
individual [against the interests] of the community as a whole.”14   
 Lastly, it bears noting that in measuring the purported justifications in both the negative 
and positive contexts, “the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation [or discretion] in 
determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention.”15  Because of 
“their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state authorities 
are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the . . . 
‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty.’”16  The amount of discretion afforded to national 
authorities varies according to the circumstances, however.  For example, where there is a 
consensus on an issue between the laws of the Convention States, then “the margin of 
appreciation will be narrow and deviation from it will be difficult to justify.”17  The opposite 
                                                                                                                                                   
. . . Heathrow airport and the aircraft which use it are not owned, controlled 
or operated by the Government or by any agency of the Government.  The 
Court considers that, accordingly, the United Kingdom cannot be said to 
have “interfered” with the applicant’s private or family life.  Instead, the 
applicant’s complaints fall to be analysed in terms of a positive duty on the 
State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s 
rights under Article 8(1) of the Convention. 
 Id. at ¶ 95.  Although the Grand Chamber in Hatton eventually found no violation of Article 8, 
see Hatton et al. v. UK, No. 36022/97[GC], ¶ 130, 37 EHRR 611 (8 July 2003), had it ruled in 
favor of the applicants, the Government might have had to legislate new noise or flight 
restrictions at the airport in order to comply with its positive obligations. 
12  See Marckx v. Belgium, No. 6833/74[PC], ¶ 31, A-31, 2 EHRR 330 (13 June 1979) (“[Article 8] 
does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily 
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for 
family life.”). 
13  Id. 
14  Powell & Rayner v. UK, No. 9310/81, ¶ 41, A-172, 12 EHRR 355 (21 Feb. 1990) (“[E]ven in 
relation to the positive obligations flowing from the first paragraph of Article 8, in striking [the 
required] balance the aims mentioned in the second paragraph may be of certain relevance.”). 
15  Id. 
16  Handyside v. UK, No. 5493/72[PC], ¶¶ 48-49, A-24, 1 EHRR 737 (7 Dec. 1976). 
17  Kilkelly, supra note 7, at p. 7. 
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holds true, however, if “customs, policies and practices vary considerably between 
contracting states.”18  Strasbourg also has ruled that there is “usually a wide margin of 
appreciation in questions of morals, in relation to the implementation of positive obligations, 
when there is a foreseeable danger to public safety and urgent measures are required[,] and 
when dealing with national security.”19  Conversely, “where Government policy in the form of 
criminal laws interferes with a particularly intimate aspect of an individual’s private life, the 
margin of appreciation left to the Government will be reduced in scope.”20 
B. The Court’s Methods of Interpretation 
 Also important to an understanding of this Paper are some of the interpretative methods 
the Court employs to inject meaning into words and phrases of the Convention.  The most 
prominent of these principles may be grouped as follows: (1) the Vienna Convention principle 
of textual interpretation in light of object and purpose; (2) dynamic interpretation; and (3) 
autonomous interpretation. 
 As with most treaties, the Court has stated that in interpreting the Convention it should 
first utilize the interpretative methods described in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.21  Therefore, words and phrases must be interpreted according to their ordinary 
meaning and in light of the object and purpose of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.22  Generally speaking, the object and purpose of the Convention is to “maintain and 
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society.”23  As will be demonstrated in Part I.C, 
this canon of interpretation has been used by the Court to define private life in a way that 
arguably exceeds its ordinary meaning.24 
                                                
18  Id. at p. 8. 
19  Iain Cameron, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS pp. 96-97 
(4th ed. 2002). 
20  Hatton [GC], supra note 11, at ¶ 102. 
21 See Golder v. UK, No. 4451/70[PC], ¶ 29, A-18, 1 EHRR 524 (21 Feb. 1975). 
22  See Vienna Convention Art. 31.  The Vienna Convention also states that terms may sometimes be 
interpreted by referring to an instrument’s legislative history or travaux préparatoires.  See 
Vienna Convention Art. 32.  However, the legislative history of the Convention on Human Rights 
provides no guidance whatsoever on how to define “private life.”  See, e.g., Louise Doswald-
Beck, The Meaning of the “Right to Respect for Private Life” Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 283, p. 286 (1983) (“[T]here is no discussion at all as to the 
meaning of private life.”); Jacques Velu, The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Right to Respect for Private Life, the Home and Communications in PRIVACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS p. 15 (A.H. Robertson ed. 1973) (“Scrutiny of the travaux préparatoires on Article 8 of 
the Convention does not provide much material for interpretation.”). 
23  Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, No. 15576/89[PC], ¶ 119, A-201, 14 EHRR 1 (7 June 1990); see also 
Ovey, supra note 9, at p. 37 (“The yardstick of democratic standards runs through the Convention 
and has proved to be an important source of inspiration in delimiting the requirements of the 
Convention.”). 
24  See, e.g., P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS pp. 73-74 (3d ed. 1998) (“The emphasis placed on object and 
purpose of the Convention . . . has led the Court, on many occasions, to adopt a fairly progressive 
or activist approach.”) [hereinafter van Dijk]. 
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 It logically follows from the emphasis placed upon the object and purpose of the 
Convention, that terms in the Convention must be interpreted dynamically.25  That is to say, 
the Convention should be read as a living instrument, one where the meaning of terms may 
change over time depending on societal views.  As was recently stated: 
The standards of the Convention are not regarded as static, but as 
reflective of social changes.  This evolutive approach towards 
interpretation of the Convention implies that the Commission and the 
Court take into account contemporary realities and attitudes, not the 
situation prevailing at the time of the drafting of the Convention in 
1949-1950.26 
Judge Loucaides has noted that application of this canon “promises that new rights derived 
from the notion of ‘private life’ will continually be recognized whenever required by the 
conditions of social life.”27  (Indeed, the principle can arguably be seen in the Court’s 
decisions that acknowledge homosexuality and transsexuality as components of private life).28  
Others have argued, however, that the Court should take care not to cross the fine line 
between “interpreting an existing right in dynamic fashion and creating new rights”29 out of 
whole cloth.30 
  The Court also is cognizant of a need to take an autonomous approach to interpreting 
certain provisions of the Convention.  Some of the concepts and “terms used in this treaty are 
considered to have a special, autonomous meaning, which is independent from, and does not 
necessarily correspond to, the meaning which identical or similar terms may have in the 
                                                
25  See Harris, supra note 4, at p. 7. 
26  van Dijk, supra note 24, at pp. 77-78; see also Philip Leach, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS p. 96 (2001) (“The Convention is seen as a ‘living instrument’ and 
therefore the role of the Court is to interpret the Convention in the light of present day conditions 
and situations, rather than to try to assess what was intended by the original drafters of the 
Convention in the late 1940s.”); Andrew Drzemczewski, THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE 
AND FAMILY LIFE, HOME AND CORRESPONDENCE p. 17 (1984) (“[M]ore often than not--
especially with respect to Article 8--both the Commission and the Court have been prepared to 
interpret the [C]onvention’s provisions by emphasising the evolutive, dynamic and progressive 
elements of principles enshrined therein.”). 
27  Loukis G. Loucaides, Personality and Privacy Under the European Convention on Human Rights 
in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPING LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS p. 86 (1995). 
28  See Part I.C infra. 
29  Cameron, supra note 19, at p. 61. 
30  See Heribert Golsong, Interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights Beyond the 
Confines of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties? in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS pp. 151-161 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold 
eds. 1993) (complaining that the Convention institutions have used the concepts of dynamic and 
autonomous interpretation to deviate wrongly from the intended meaning of the Convention); 
Deumeland v. Germany, No. 9384/81[PC], ¶ 24, A-100, 8 EHRR 448 (29 May 1986) (joint 
dissenting opinion) (“An evolutive interpretation allows variable and changing concepts already 
contained in the Convention to be construed in the light of modern-day conditions, but it does not 
allow entirely new concepts or spheres of application to be introduced into the Convention: that is 
a legislative function that belongs to the Member States of the Council of Europe.”). 
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui  Page 7 of 40  
Candidate # 830001 
domestic law of the Contracting States.”31  The reason for maintaining the interpretive 
distance is simple.  As Professor Cameron has explained, “[c]ertain terms used in the 
Convention must logically mean something different from the equivalent terms in national 
legal systems, as otherwise the Convention is simply a ratification of the existing state of 
national institutions and civil liberties.”32  Of course, this is not to say that every term must 
have a different meaning, but it gives the Court the wiggle room necessary to maintain its 
independence.  Again, commentators have warned, however, that “this method must be used 
by the interpreter with great care, because otherwise he runs the risk of creating so-called 
autonomous concepts which do not have any foundation in the Convention system itself.”33 
C. The Meaning of Private Life as Interpreted by Strasbourg 
 Having covered the procedural aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence, I now turn to its 
substance.  Over the years, the Court has refined and expanded its interpretation of the phrase 
“private life,” but it has not (until arguably recently)34 attempted a general definition.  A 
review of the case law and academic literature demonstrates that the Court has created two 
main categories of protection within the rubric of private life: (1) those matters that come 
within the traditional meaning of privacy, i.e., matters that should be kept secret or free from 
publicity--labeled herein as the privacy component; and (2) those matters that involve a 
person’s personality or autonomy--labeled herein as the personal choice component.  I briefly 
trace these developments in the next several paragraphs.35 
 There seems to be little doubt that the Convention organs have always understood 
private life to encompass the ordinary and traditional meaning of privacy.  That is to say, that 
as a general principle, Strasbourg has always recognized that the right to private life means 
the right to “live, as far as one wishes, protected from publicity.”36  Nevertheless, as has been 
noted previously, the exact contours of this privacy component have been left for 
determination on a case-by-case basis.  In that fashion, Strasbourg has over the years found 
the following matters (among others) to implicate the privacy component of Article 8: (1) a 
person’s HIV status;37 (2) a secret police register containing personal information about the 
                                                
31  van Dijk, supra note 24, at p. 77. 
32  Cameron, supra note 19, at p. 64. 
33  F. Matscher, Methods of Interpretation of the Convention in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS p. 73 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold eds. 
1993). 
34  See Part II infra regarding the emerging “reasonable expectation of privacy” test in the case law. 
35  It is important to note that the Convention institutions do not expressly separate their analyses into 
these two categories.  This is a construction, based on my reading of the cases, which I believe 
best compartmentalizes the rights.  My reason for choosing the “personal choice” label in 
particular--as opposed to stating “personality,” as the Court has--will become apparent in Part III 
of this Paper.  Suffice to say, that the proposal herein would be conceptually (and grammatically) 
unworkable with the “personality” label. 
36  G. Cohen-Jonathan, Respect for Private and Family Life in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS p. 406 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold eds. 
1993), quoting X. v. Iceland, No. 6825/74, 5 DR 86 (18 May 1976). 
37  See Z. v. Finland, No. 22009/93, ECHR 1997-I, 25 EHRR 371 (25 Feb. 1997) (applicant’s 
medical records with HIV status used in a criminal prosecution). 
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applicant;38 (3) social services records containing information about a person’s formative 
years;39 and (4) a person’s gender identification in transsexual cases.40  Fortunately, many of 
the cases have been easy for the Court and Commission to decide, typically because the 
government acknowledged or did not contest the private nature of the matter involved.  But 
unfortunately, Strasbourg has not as of yet provided sufficient and consistent guidance for 
deciding the tough cases.  
 Not surprisingly, most of the action in the case law has related to the personal choice 
component of private life.  The Commission made its first step to expand beyond privacy and 
into personal choice in its decision X. v. Iceland,41 a case challenging a regulation that 
prohibited the applicant from keeping a dog in his home.  There, the Commission stated: 
For numerous anglo-saxon and French authors the right to respect for 
‘private life’ is the right to privacy, the right to live, as far as one 
wishes, protected from publicity.   
 In the opinion of the Commission, however, the right to respect 
for private life does not end there.  It comprises also, to a certain 
degree, the right to establish and to develop relationships with other 
human beings, especially in the emotional field for the development 
and fulfillment of one’s own personality. 
 The Commission cannot, however, accept that the protection 
afforded by Article 8 of the Convention extends to relationships of the 
individual with his entire immediate surroundings, insofar as they do 
not involve human relationships and notwithstanding the desire of the 
individual to keep such relationship within the private sphere.  [¶] . . . 
It follows that Article 8 of the Convention cannot be interpreted such 
as to secure to everybody the right to keep a dog.42 
 Private life was later expanded further by making the concept of “personality” the point 
of departure for future decisions.  The Commission stated in Brüggemann & Scheuten v. 
Germany, that the “right of respect for private life is of such a scope as to secure to the 
individual a sphere within which he can freely pursue the development and fulfillment of his 
                                                
38  See Leander v. Sweden, No. 9248/81, A-116, 9 EHRR 433 (26 Mar. 1987) (applicant denied 
access to a police register which allegedly contained personal information about him). 
39  See Gaskin v. UK, No. 10454/83[PC], A-160, 12 EHRR 36 (7 July 1989) (applicant denied the 
right to examine a social services file concerning his childhood history). 
40  See B. v. France, No. 13343/87[PC], A-232-C, 16 EHRR 1 (25 Mar. 1992) (applicant’s request 
denied to change her civil status from male to female and her name from Norbert Antoine to Lyne 
Antoinette). 
41  No. 6825/74, 5 DR 86 (18 May 1976). 
42  Id. at ¶¶ 11-13, 16.  It is questionable whether the outcome of this case would be the same had the 
Court applied the test proposed in Part III of this Paper and framed the question as being whether 
a reasonable person, without reference to any purported justifications offered by the government 
for the restriction, would expect that the decision to keep a dog as a house pet is a matter of 
personal choice.  See infra Part III. 
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personality.”43  Since then, the Convention organs have held, in piecemeal fashion, that the 
following also implicate the personal choice component of private life: (1) a person’s 
surname;44 (2) a person’s sexual lifestyle;45 (3) a person’s clothing;46 (4) a person’s medical 
treatment;47 (5) a person’s sexual integrity;48 and (6) a person’s physical integrity.49  
Nevertheless, as with its complement, Strasbourg has not provided sufficient guidance to 
national courts and legislatures as to what other sorts of matters might later be found to 
involve private life under this second component. 
* * * 
 In spite of the case-by-case approaches noted above, or perhaps because of them, some 
Court opinions from Strasbourg have recently taken steps towards providing a better 
framework for deciding the privacy component cases--namely by gauging the applicant’s 
reasonable expectations.  A review of that trend is covered in the next section. 
II. THE EXPLICIT APPEARANCE OF A “REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY” TEST 
IN THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE AS A BASIS FOR DEFINING THE PRIVACY 
COMPONENT OF PRIVATE LIFE 
 The reasonable-expectations test has appeared as a basis for assessing the privacy 
component of private life in five reported judgments of the Court, starting in 1997 and 
continuing through 2004.  As will be seen in the sections that follow, the test features 
prominently in the first and fifth cases, with some members of the Court even writing 
separately in the fifth case to advocate its use.  However, the test appears more as background 
noise in the others, perhaps due to unease or unfamiliarity in its use.  Nevertheless, it can be 
said that the Court appears eager to pursue or at least explore reasonable expectations as the 
benchmark in future cases.  In my view, this is an area ripe for development in general and for 
expansion into personal choice cases. 
                                                
43  No. 6959/75, at ¶ 55, 3 EHRR 244 (12 July 1977); see also Doswald-Beck, supra note 22, at p. 
309 (“In assessing the Commission’s attempt at definition, it would seem that the most recent 
attempt, that is, respect for the development of personality, could be interpreted so as to 
encompass most situations relating to what would normally be seen as private life, thus making it 
flexible enough.”); Karen Reid, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS p. 323 (1998) (“The concept stands for the sphere of immediate personal 
autonomy.”). 
44  See Stjerna v. Finland, No. 18131/91, A-299-B, 24 EHRR 94 (25 Nov. 1994) (applicant sought to 
change his last name); Burghartz v. Switzerland, No. 16213/90, A-280-B, 18 EHRR 101 (22 Feb. 
1994) (same). 
45  See Dudgeon v. UK, No. 7525/76[PC], A-45, 4 EHRR 149 (23 Sept. 1981) (applicant affected by 
laws criminalizing his homosexual lifestyle). 
46  See McFeeley v. UK, No. 8317/78, 3 EHRR 161 (15 May 1980) (prisoner applicant required to 
wear a certain prison uniform). 
47  See Herczegfalvy v. Austria, No. 10533/83, A-244, 15 EHRR 437 (24 Sept. 1992) (applicant 
forced to receive medical treatment). 
48  See X. & Y. v. Netherlands, No. 8978/80, A-91, 8 EHRR 235 (26 Mar. 1985) (applicant’s 
mentally handicapped daughter sexually assaulted, but national law provided no remedy). 
49  See Costello-Roberts v. UK, No. 13134/87, A-247-C, 19 EHRR 112 (25 Mar. 1993) (applicant 
corporally punished in an educational setting without redress). 
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 The five judgments are discussed in chronological order. 
A. Halford v. The United Kingdom 
 The phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” first appeared in a Strasbourg opinion in 
1997 in the case of Halford v. The United Kingdom.50  The applicant, Ms. Alison Halford, had 
worked in 1983 as an Assistant Chief Constable with the Merseyside police and was at the 
time the highest-ranking female police officer in the United Kingdom.  Over the following 
seven years, Ms. Halford applied several times, unsuccessfully, for a promotion to the rank of 
Deputy Chief Constable.  Feeling that the denials were based on a discriminatory motive, she 
brought a claim against the Chief Constable, among others, for gender discrimination.  She 
also accused certain members of the Merseyside Police Authority of having launched a 
campaign against her in retaliation for her bringing the complaint.51   
 Most important to our analysis here, however, is the fact that Ms. Halford further 
alleged that “calls made from her home and her office telephones were intercepted for the 
purposes of obtaining information to use against her in the discrimination proceedings.”52  
Because the Government conceded that Article 8 would cover home telephone interceptions, 
the Court undertook no applicability analysis in that regard.53  Instead, the fight over the 
applicability of Article 8 centered on the workplace interceptions. 
 Ms. Halford argued that the calls she made from her office fell within the scope of 
private life and correspondence under Article 8(1).  The Government countered, however, that 
those telephone calls 
fell outside the protection of Article 8 . . . because she could have had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to them.  At the 
                                                
50  No. 20605/92, ECHR 1997-III, 24 EHRR 523 (25 June 1997).  However, the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test is often said to have originated in the United States Supreme Court’s 
1967 decision in Katz v. United States, a case dealing with an individual’s right under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable government searches 
and seizures.  389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Not unlike the Convention on 
Human Rights, the Fourth Amendment states that the “right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”  U.S. Constitution Amend. IV.  In Katz, the Supreme Court departed from earlier cases 
that focused on the presence of the items listed in the Amendment as demonstrating the 
applicability of the Amendment and held that those seeking to invoke the Amendment must 
instead show an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or object that the 
government has observed, searched or seized.  See id. at pp. 348-359, 361.  It also bears noting 
that several jurisdictions within the United States have also used the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test as an element of the tort of intrusion of privacy.  See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 
F.2d 701, p. 704 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Shulman v. Group W productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, pp. 
208-210 (1998).  I have found much of the literature that exists in the United States on these two 
subjects to be useful in preparing this Paper. 
51  See Halford, supra note 50, at ¶¶ 9-12. 
52  Id. at ¶ 17. 
53  The Court ultimately found no violation of Article 8 with respect to the alleged home 
interceptions because there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the home tapping actually 
occurred.  In other words, there was no interference. 
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hearing before the Court, counsel for the Government expressed the 
view that an employer should in principle, without the prior 
knowledge of the employee, be able to monitor calls made by the 
latter on telephones provided by the employer.54 
 Although the Court ultimately disagreed with the Government’s conclusion that Article 
8 had not been implicated, it did adopt the Government’s proposed “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test.  The Court began by noting that phone calls made from business premises can 
in certain circumstances be covered by private life and correspondence.  The Court then went 
on to state: 
There is no evidence of any warning having been given to Ms 
Halford, as a user of the internal telecommunications system operated 
at the Merseyside police headquarters, that calls made on that system 
would be liable to interception.  She would, the Court considers, have 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy for such calls, which 
expectation was moreover reinforced by a number of factors.  As 
Assistant Chief Constable she had sole use of her office where there 
were two telephones, one of which was specifically designated for her 
private use.  Furthermore, she had been given the assurance, in the 
response to a memorandum, that she could use her office telephones 
for the purposes of her sex-discrimination case . . . .55 
Not surprisingly, the Court then held that the “conversations held by Ms Halford on her office 
telephones fell within the scope of the notion[] of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence.’”56  
Having found no proper justification for the interference, the Court concluded that a violation 
of Article 8 had occurred.57   
 The decision is remarkable, of course, for its first use of the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test.  But it also highlights an issue that will be discussed in Part III.D of this Paper:  
Should the reasonable-expectations test be used to judge solely the issue of private life or 
should it also be used to judge all of the other rights contained in Article 8 (including home, 
family life and correspondence)?58  I raise this issue here because in Halford the Court (and 
Government, for that matter) seemed to sweep the applicability of both private life and 
correspondence under the rubric of reasonable expectations.  There are two possible 
explanations for their imprecision.  Perhaps it was intentional and, by melding private life and 
correspondence together in their analyses, the Government and the Court intended the 
reasonable-expectations test to govern the applicability of private life and correspondence.  
The imprecision may have been inadvertent, however, with the Court intending that 
reasonable expectations govern private life only, and that correspondence continue to be 
                                                
54  Id. at ¶ 43 (emphasis added). 
55  Id. at ¶ 45 (emphasis added). 
56  Id. at ¶ 46. 
57  See id. at ¶ 51. 
58  See infra Part III.D. 
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analyzed separately.59  In any event, as will be explained further along in this Paper, if the 
Court elects to adopt reasonable expectations as its benchmark in the future, it will have to 
describe clearly whether the test is intended to pertain solely to private life or whether (and 
how) it will be used with respect to the other rights in Article 8. 
B. P.G. & J.H. v. The United Kingdom 
 It was not until four years later that the Court again mentioned the reasonable-
expectations test, this time in P.G. & J.H. v. The United Kingdom,60 a case concerning, among 
other things, whether the police can covertly record a suspect’s voice in order to obtain a 
voice sample while the suspect is being detained at the police station. 
 The P.G. & J.H. case began when the police received a tip that one of the applicants, 
P.G., and another person, B., were planning to rob a cash-collection van on or around 2 March 
1995.  In an effort to thwart the robbery, the police installed a covert listening device in a sofa 
in B.’s apartment.  The police were particularly interested in using the surveillance 
information to attempt to identify an unknown third member of the conspiracy (later 
determined to be the second applicant in the case, J.H.).  Over the next several days, the 
police recorded several conversations between B. and the other conspirators and 
photographed several persons going in and out of the apartment, including P.G. and J.H.  But 
before the police could link the applicants (particularly J.H.) to the voices on the tapes, B. and 
the others discovered the bug.  The men abandoned the apartment, and the robbery did not 
take place at the prescribed time.61 
 Soon thereafter, the police arrested the applicants for driving a stolen automobile.  Both 
applicants refused to answer any questions or to provide the police with voice samples.  So in 
order to obtain the speech samples they so desperately wanted, the police installed covert 
listening devices on the police officers that were present when the applicants were charged 
and in the applicants’ cells.  The applicants were then recorded, without their knowledge or 
permission, during the charging procedure and while incarcerated.62  The evidence obtained 
permitted the police to match the applicants’ voices to the voices featured on the surveillance 
audiotapes.63 
 After being tried and convicted for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, largely by use 
of the tapes and voice samples at trial, the applicants’ complaint found its way to Strasbourg.  
The issue we are most concerned with here is the use of the covert listening devices at the 
                                                
59  If this latter explanation is the more plausible, I query why the Court even discussed reasonable 
expectations in the first place given that the Court could have avoided the private-life issue 
altogether and instead relied solely on the notion of correspondence in order to reach the same 
result.  See A. v. France, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 33-36 (holding that a telephone call constitutes 
correspondence under Article 8 regardless of whether its contents are of a private matter, and then 
finding it unnecessary to analyze the question under private life). 
60  No. 44787/98, ECHR 2001-IX (25 Sept. 2001). 
61  See id. at ¶¶ 8-14. 
62  Some of the conversations recorded in the cells were between J.H. and his solicitor and were 
therefore not used against the applicants at trial. 
63  See id. at ¶¶ 15-17. 
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police station, as it is in that context that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test arose.64  
The applicants submitted that there was a breach of privacy because they did not know or 
have reason to suspect that their conversations were being recorded.  Rather, they believed 
that they were speaking only to the person they were addressing.65 
 The Government countered that private life was not involved because the “recordings 
were not made to obtain any private or substantive information,”66 but were instead made to 
obtain a voice sample of the applicants.  Most importantly, the Government argued that the 
“aural quality of the applicants’ voices was not part of private life but was rather a public, 
external feature.”67  The Government further reminded the Court that some of the recordings 
were made while the applicants “were being charged--a formal process of criminal justice, in 
the presence of at least one police officer.”68  In light of the foregoing circumstances, the 
Government urged the Court to find that the applicants had “no expectation of privacy.”69 
 The Court rejected the Government’s view.  After summarizing some of the categories 
of matters that have been protected under private life in the past, the Court stated: 
There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether 
a person’s private life is concerned by measures effected outside a 
person’s home or private premises.  Since there are occasions when 
people knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in activities 
which are or may be recorded or reported in a public manner, a 
person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, 
although not necessarily conclusive, factor.  [For example,] [a] person 
who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member 
of the public who is also present.  Monitoring by technological means 
of the same public scene (for example, a security guard viewing 
through closed-circuit television) is of a similar character.70   
 But the Court then seemed to stress that the important issue was whether and how the 
applicants’ information was processed: 
Private-life considerations may arise, however, once any systematic or 
permanent record comes into existence of such material from the 
public domain.  It is for this reason that files gathered by security 
services on a particular individual fall within the scope of Article 8, 
even where the information has not been gathered by any intrusive or 
                                                
64  The applicants also complained about the legality of the bug at B.’s flat and the use of information 
obtained from a telephone company regarding B.’s use of his telephone.  However, the 
Government did not contest the applicability of private life in those matters. 
65  See id. at ¶ 52. 
66  Id. at ¶ 54. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at ¶ 57 (emphasis added). 
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covert method.71  The Court has referred in this context to the Council 
of Europe’s Convention of 28 January 1981 for the protection of 
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data . . . 
and whose purpose is “to secure in the territory of each Party for every 
individual . . . respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in 
particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of 
personal data relating to him,” such data being identified as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual.”72 
 Turning then to the case before it, the Court stated that the recordings taken for use as 
voice samples fell within the scope of private life.  “A permanent record has . . . been made of 
the person’s voice and it is subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying that 
person in the context of other personal data.”73  The Court concluded that “[t]hough it is true 
that when being charged the applicants answered formal questions in a place where police 
officers were listening to them, the recording and analysis of their voices on this occasion 
must still be regarded as concerning the processing of personal data about the applicants.”74 
 It is a little unclear from the Court’s opinion whether it intended the fact of personal 
data processing to be the dispositive issue or simply another factor to be considered in 
addition to or as part of the analysis of the applicant’s reasonable expectations of privacy.  It 
would seem to me that some species of the latter reading is the correct one as otherwise the 
Court’s discussion of reasonable expectations would have been superfluous.  But that then 
begs the follow-up question of how reasonable expectations and processing relate to each 
other as criteria.  Are they separate, independent criteria or is processing subsumed within the 
other?  An argument can certainly been made that they are independent criteria, but I am more 
                                                
71  At this point in the opinion, the Court cites the decision of Rotaru v. Romania, No. 
28341/95[GC], ECHR 2000-V (4 May 2000), which held that admittedly-public information 
about a person’s political activism nevertheless falls within the scope of private life if it is later 
systematically collected and stored in files held by governmental authorities.  Judge Bonello 
dissented, arguing that activities that are by their very nature public, and which are actually 
nourished by publicity, are well outside the protection of Article 8.  See id. at ¶ 3 (Bonello, J., 
dissenting).  He further stated: 
In what way does the storage of records relating to the eminently public 
pursuits of an individual violate his right to privacy?  Until now the Court 
has held, unimpeachably in my view, that the protection of Article 8 extends 
to confidential matters, such as medical and health data, sexual activity and 
orientation, family kinship and, possibly, professional and business relations 
and other intimate areas in which public intrusion would be an unwarranted 
encroachment on the natural barriers of self.  Public activism in public 
political parties has, I suggest, little in common with the ratio which elevates 
the protection of privacy into a fundamental human right. 
 Id. at ¶ 6. 
72  P.G. & J.H., supra note 60, at ¶ 57 (emphasis added); see also Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection 
Pursuant to the Right of Privacy in Human Rights Treaties, 6 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 247 
passim (1998) (discussing the extent to which Article 8 embraces the principles and guarantees 
found in data protection laws). 
73  P.G. & J.H., supra note 60, at ¶ 59. 
74  Id. 
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inclined to favor the other approach, primarily because I cannot imagine a situation where the 
Court would hold that private life has been implicated because information was processed 
even though the information related to matters in which no reasonable person could have an 
expectation of privacy.  As I see it, data processing is a simply a factor to consider, among 
others, in determining whether an expectation was reasonable.   
 It is thus unfortunate that the Court did not frame its conclusion within the rubric of 
reasonable expectations.  Perhaps this is because the Court felt uncomfortable stating, given 
the public nature of people’s voices and the location where the voice samples were taken, that 
the applicants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their voices.  Yet the Court could 
have made such a statement had it recognized that expectations of privacy can be partial.75  
Within the context of the reasonable-expectations test, it could be said that the applicants in 
P.G. & J.H had a reasonable, partial expectation of privacy in the sound of their voices.  
Although a reasonable person might expect their voice to be heard in normal conversation, 
one could nevertheless reasonably expect to retain at least some degree of privacy in that 
voice, perhaps expecting that at most only the people who are present (and whom the speaker 
is aware of) might contemporaneously hear and recognize their voice.  A reasonable person 
under the circumstances would probably not foresee the sort of electronic recording and 
analysis (i.e., data processing) that occurred in P.G. & J.H. 
C. Peck v. The United Kingdom 
 The Court next encountered the “reasonable expectation of privacy” issue in Peck v. 
The United Kingdom.76  The case involved the televising and publication of the aftermath of a 
person’s suicide attempt.  The Court relied heavily on the reasoning of P.G. & J.H. and 
therefore also highlighted the importance of processing of information as an important factor 
in determining the applicability of Article 8.  However, as with P.G. & J.H., it too can be read 
as continuing to endorse a reasonable-expectations approach.   
 The applicant, Geoffrey Peck, was suffering from depression as a result of personal and 
family circumstances.  One late night during August 1995, he walked alone to a central road 
junction in the center of the city of Brentwood and attempted suicide by cutting his wrists 
with a kitchen knife.  He stayed at the junction for a time and leaned over a railing facing the 
traffic with the knife in his hand.  Unbeknownst to Mr. Peck, however, was the fact that the 
city was contemporaneously observing and recording his actions through a camera mounted 
on the traffic island in front of the junction.  Although the camera did not capture him actually 
slitting his wrists, it did show him at the junction in possession of the knife.  Police arrived at 
the scene shortly thereafter, took the knife from Mr. Peck, and then gave him medical 
assistance.  Ultimately, Mr. Peck was released and no charges were filed.77 
                                                
75  This is an important point that I will come back to later in Part III.B infra. 
76  No. 44647/98, ECHR 2003-I, 36 EHRR 719 (28 Jan. 2003). 
77  See id. at ¶¶ 9-11. 
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 But the story does not end there.  The city council issued a press release touting the fact 
that its camera surveillance system had helped prevent a “potentially dangerous situation.”78  
The release specifically noted that 
an individual had been spotted with a knife in his hand, that he was 
clearly unhappy but not looking for trouble, that the police had been 
alerted, [and] that the individual had been disarmed and brought to the 
police station where he was questioned and given assistance for his 
problems.79 
 The press release also included two still photographs of Mr. Peck holding the knife (his 
face was not digitally masked) that were taken from the camera footage.  The story and the 
photographs of Mr. Peck eventually made their way into local newspapers with the 
permission of the city and ultimately appeared, along with video footage of the event (also 
obtained by permission from the city), on a BBC television show called Crime Beat.80  
Consequently, Mr. Peck complained to a number of domestic adjudicative bodies, alleging an 
unwarranted infringement of his privacy, but his claims were all rejected.81 
 Bringing his claims before the Court, Mr. Peck argued that the disclosure by the city of 
the relevant footage and the subsequent publication and broadcasting constituted a 
disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his private life in violation of Article 
8.  One of the principal issues in the case was whether, in light of the location of the activities 
and the circumstances of the filming, Mr. Peck’s private life had even been implicated.  The 
U.K. government argued that it had not because Mr. Peck’s actions were allegedly already in 
the public domain.  Specifically, the Government argued that the “[d]isclosure of those 
actions simply distributed a public event to a wider public and could not change the public 
quality of the applicant’s original conduct and render it more private.”82  Mr. Peck countered 
that his private life was involved because the relevant footage related to an attempted suicide 
and he was unaware that he was being filmed. 
 The Court sided with Mr. Peck and found that private life had in fact been implicated.  
The Court began by quoting verbatim from the passage in P.G. & J.H. that discusses the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.  It then discussed factors that are important in 
determining whether public activities become private for purposes of Article 8 that, like P.G. 
& J.H., basically rely on whether and how the public activities are processed (again, a step 
consistent with the concept of partial expectations of privacy mentioned in my discussion of 
P.G. & J.H.): 
The monitoring of the actions of an individual in a public place by the 
use of photographic equipment which does not record the visual data 
does not, as such, give rise to an interference with the individual’s 
                                                
78  Id. at ¶ 13. 
79  Id. 
80  Although the Crime Beat program masked Mr. Peck’s face, that masking was inadequate and 
many of Mr. Peck’s friends and family who saw the program recognized him. 
81  See id. at ¶¶ 12-23. 
82  Id. at ¶ 53. 
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private life.  On the other hand, the recording of the data and the 
systematic or permanent nature of the record may give rise to such 
considerations. . . . [¶]  [Also important are whether the data] remain 
anonymous in that no names [are] noted down, . . . [whether] the 
personal data . . . [are] entered into a data-processing system . . . [and 
whether the data] [have] been made available to the general public or 
[will] be used for any other purpose.83 
 Analyzing the facts before it, the Court made much of the fact that the newspaper 
stories about the applicant were “distributed in the applicant’s locality to approximately 
24,000 readers” and that the video footage was broadcast “locally to approximately 350,000 
people and [on] the BBC broadcast nationally.”84  The Court then concluded that private life 
was involved because “the relevant moment was viewed to an extent which far exceeded any 
exposure to a passer-by or to security observation . . . and to a degree surpassing that which 
the applicant could possibly have foreseen when he walked in [the city on the date in 
question].”85 
 Despite its apparent emphasis on data processing, it seems to me (once again) that the 
Court is essentially stating that the disclosure of the footage invaded Mr. Peck’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  A reasonable person might expect that what Mr. Peck did would be a 
private matter to a certain extent (visible, perhaps, only by people who happened to be 
passing by).  However, one would not expect or foresee the sort of use and disclosure (i.e., 
data processing) that occurred.  So although Mr. Peck cannot claim an absolute expectation of 
privacy, he can claim a partial one.  Of course, it should go without saying that if Mr. Peck 
had known that a BBC television crew was filming his actions, he could not have reasonably 
expected that his actions would be private.86 
D. Perry v. The United Kingdom 
 Similar in facts and outcome to P.G. & J.H., was the Court’s next decision in Perry v. 
The United Kingdom,87 a case involving the covert videotaping of a suspect at a police station.  
There, the applicant was suspected of robbing several mini-cab drivers.  The police 
                                                
83  Id. at ¶¶ 59, 61. 
84  Id. at ¶ 62. 
85  Id. (emphasis added). 
86  This is as good a place as any to raise a point regarding what different societies perceive are 
reasonable expectations.  Whereas the European Court of Human Rights essentially found a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in Peck, I find it doubtful, based on my own non-scientific 
perception, that the result would be the same in the United States.  Television viewers in the 
United States are bombarded with countless shows that use footage obtained from police and 
safety cameras.  We have grown so accustomed to seeing people on camera in such a manner that 
I think most people would say that, given the openness of his activity, Mr. Peck could have had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his case (even a partial one), regardless of how widely the 
video was disseminated. 
87  No. 63737/00, 39 EHRR 76 (17 July 2003). 
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subsequently arrested the applicant and asked him to participate in an identification parade.  
Despite agreeing to appear several times for the lineup, the applicant reneged.88   
 Because the prosecution’s case rested almost entirely on the ability of the witnesses to 
identify the perpetrator, the police decided to covertly videotape the applicant after luring him 
to return to the police station.  The police used a camera that was already in place in the 
custody suite (an area where police personnel and other suspects came and went on a regular 
basis) and which was in the normal course of business kept running at all times.  However, 
because of the special needs in this case, an engineer adjusted the camera to ensure that it took 
clearer pictures during the applicant’s visit.  After the applicant was videotaped, “[a] 
compilation tape was prepared in which eleven volunteers imitated the actions of the 
applicant as captured on the covert video.  This video was shown to various witnesses of the 
armed robberies, of whom two positively identified the applicant.”89  The applicant was then 
tried and convicted based in large part on the identifications. 
 After exhausting his domestic remedies, the applicant complained in Strasbourg of an 
Article 8 violation, specifically alleging that the filming in the police station infringed his 
right to private life.  He made much of the fact that the camera was running at a different 
speed to produce a clearer image and that he did not know of the camera.  Importantly, he 
further argued that even if he had known of the camera, he could not have known that it 
would be used for identification purposes.90 
 The Government countered that the images related to public (not private) matters, that 
the video camera was easily visible, and that therefore the applicant could not have had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in such an environment.  The Government also argued that 
the footage was not processed given that the “section concerning the applicant was simply 
extracted and put with footage of the eleven volunteers and there was no public disclosure or 
broadcast of the images.”91 
 The Court disagreed and found that private life had been implicated.  As it had in the 
past, the Court first stated that “a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy is a 
significant though not necessarily conclusive factor.”92  But it also then cited the relevance of 
processing.  Turning to the merits, the Court stated as follows: 
[T]he normal use of security cameras per se whether in the public 
street or on premises, such as shopping centres or police stations 
where they serve a legitimate and foreseeable purpose, do not raise 
issues under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.  Here, however, the 
police regulated the security camera so that it could take clear footage 
of the applicant in the custody suite . . . to show to witnesses for the 
purposes of seeing whether they identified the applicant . . . .  The 
question is whether this use of the camera and footage constituted a 
                                                
88  See id. at ¶¶ 8-12. 
89  Id. at ¶ 15. 
90  See id. at ¶ 30. 
91  Id. at ¶ 33. 
92  Id. at ¶ 37. 
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processing or use of personal data of a nature to constitute an 
interference with respect for private life.  [¶] . . .   This ploy adopted 
by the police went beyond the normal or expected use of this type of 
camera, as indeed is demonstrated by the fact the police were required 
to obtain permission and an engineer had to adjust the camera.  The 
permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for 
further use may therefore be regarded as the processing or collecting 
of personal data about the applicant.93 
 Again, what is remarkable about this case is that, despite the stated allegiance to 
processing as being the key factor, the analysis of the Court seems more akin to one involving 
degrees of reasonable expectations of privacy.  This is apparent in the Court’s use of the terms 
“legitimate,” “foreseeable,” “normal,” and “expected.”  A reasonable person might expect 
their face to be captured on a security camera in a police station, but they could nevertheless 
reasonably expect to retain at least some degree of privacy in that image, perhaps expecting 
that at most the image would only be used if, for example, there was an incident in the area 
requiring a review of the tape.  As a reasonable person would not foresee the sort of use that 
occurred here, it can be said that the applicant reasonably retained an expectation of privacy. 
E. von Hannover v. Germany 
 The Court’s most recent and arguably significant decision in this area is von Hannover 
v. Germany,94 a case involving the often-occurring conflict between Princess Caroline of 
Monaco and the paparazzi.  There, the Court ruled that the publication of certain images of 
Princess Caroline implicated her private life.  The judgment is notable for its explicit 
reinvigoration of reasonable expectations (and the downplaying of processing alone) as the 
benchmark for future cases. 
 As any reader can likely surmise, especially those situated in Europe, Princess Caroline 
has been hounded by the paparazzi for nearly her entire life.  In the last eleven years or so, she 
has tried in vain to prevent the publication of images that she felt involved her private life.  In 
her case before the Court, she concentrated her efforts on a series of tabloid publications in 
Germany that contained, among other things, photos of her and her supposed boyfriend sitting 
in a restaurant; her canoeing, bicycling, shopping, and skiing; and her at the Monte Carlo 
Beach Club, dressed in a swimsuit, tripping over an obstacle and falling down.95  Princess 
Caroline had previously sought to enjoin these publications in the German courts but was 
unsuccessful.  The domestic courts essentially held that Princess Caroline’s privacy rights 
were diminished because of her role as a public figure.   
 The European Court of Human Rights rejected that position, at least insofar as it could 
be said the Princess had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The Court stated: 
There is . . . a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a 
public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life.”  [¶]  
The Court has also indicated that, in certain circumstances, a person 
                                                
93  Id. at ¶¶ 40-41 (emphasis added). 
94  No. 59320/00 (24 June 2004). 
95  See id. at ¶¶ 9-17. 
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has a “legitimate expectation” of protection and respect for his or her 
private life.  Accordingly, it has held in a case concerning the 
interception of telephone calls on business premises that the applicant 
“would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy for such calls.  
[Citing Halford].  [¶]  As regards photos, . . . the Commission [also] 
had regard to whether the photographs related to private or public 
matters and whether the material thus obtained was envisaged for a 
limited use or was likely to be made available to the general public.96 
 The Court then drew its conclusion, albeit with no analysis whatsoever, that “[i]n the 
present case there is no doubt that the publication by various German magazines of photos of 
the applicant in her daily life either on her own or with other people falls within the scope of 
her private life”97 and that “she should, in the circumstances of the case, have had a 
‘legitimate expectation’ of protection of her private life.”98  Notably, no mention was made of 
the data-processing test discussed in the three previous cases.  The significance of the Court’s 
omission remains to be seen, but an argument can certainly be made that the opinion 
strengthens the view that reasonable expectations is the determinative test and data processing 
is but a factor to consider within the scope of that test. 
 The Court spent the majority of its time discussing whether the Government was 
justified in its failure to provide Princess Caroline with a means (in Germany’s domestic law 
and court system) to stop the publications.  The balance the Court sought to strike in this 
positive obligation case was the protection of private life against the freedom of expression.  
The Court stressed “that a fundamental distinction [must] be made between reporting facts--
even controversial ones--capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating 
to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of the 
private life of an individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not exercise official 
functions.”99  The Court ultimately concluded that private life triumphed in this case because 
the photos at issue did not relate to Princess Caroline’s official functions but instead dealt 
exclusively with her private life.100 
 More was said about the reasonable-expectations test in the concurring opinions of 
Judges Barreto and Zupančič, both of whom doubted that all of the photographs should fall 
within the realm of private life.  Judge Barreto stated that, in his view, “whenever a public 
figure has a ‘legitimate expectation’ of being safe from the media his or her right to private 
life prevails over the right to freedom of expression or the right to be informed.”101  He then 
parted ways with the majority in his application of the test: 
The majority attach importance, for example, to the fact that the 
photos at the Monte Carlo Beach Club had been taken secretly.  I do 
                                                
96  Id. at ¶¶ 50-52 (emphasis added).  The Court appears to use the terms “reasonable expectation” 
and  “legitimate expectation” interchangeably. 
97  Id. at ¶ 53. 
98  Id. at ¶ 78. 
99  Id. at ¶ 63. 
100  See id. at ¶ 64. 
101  Id. (Barreto, J., concurring). 
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui  Page 21 of 40  
Candidate # 830001 
not dispute the need to take account of the fact that the photos were 
taken from a distance, particularly if the person was somewhere they 
could legitimately believe did not expose them to public view.  
However, the beach club swimming pool was an open place 
frequented by the general public and, moreover, visible from the 
neighboring buildings.  Is it possible in such a place to entertain a 
reasonable expectation of not being exposed to public view or to the 
media?   I do not think so. 
 I believe that this same criterion is valid for photos showing the 
applicant in other situations in her daily life in which she cannot 
expect her private life to be protected.  I have in mind the photos of 
her doing her shopping.  However, other photos--for example those of 
the applicant on horseback or playing tennis--were taken in places and 
circumstances that would call for the opposite approach.102 
 Judge Zupančič was even stronger in his advocacy for the expectation test: 
It is time that the pendulum swung back to a different kind of balance 
between what is private and secluded and what is public and 
unshielded. 
 The question here is how to ascertain and assess this balance.  I 
agree with the outcome of this case.  However, I would suggest a 
different determinative test: the one we have used in Halford v. United 
Kingdom . . . which speaks of “reasonable expectation of privacy.”  
[¶]  The context of criminal procedure and the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
Halford do not prevent us from employing the same test in cases such 
as the one before us. 
 The dilemma as to whether the applicant here was or was not a 
public figure, ceases to exist; the proposed criterion of reasonable 
expectation of privacy permits a nuanced approach to every new case.  
Perhaps this is what Judge Cabral Barreto has in mind . . . .  [¶]  . . .   
[R]easonableness is also an allusion to informed common sense, 
which tells us that he who lives in a glass house may not have the 
right to throw stones.103 
 Aside from its revitalization of the reasonable-expectations test, the von Hannover 
decision also highlights the fact that the determination of what is reasonable may “give rise to 
differences of opinion” among judges.104  Thus, if reasonable-expectations is going to be the 
benchmark for future cases, and the Court is to maintain consistency and credibility in its 
decisions, it will have to develop a more structured framework by which to proceed.  It is the 
subject of the next part of this Paper to suggest a possible framework. 
                                                
102  Id. (Barreto, J., concurring). 
103  Id. (Zupančič, J., concurring). 
104  Id. (Barreto, J., concurring). 
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III. ADOPTING AND DEVELOPING REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AS THE RULE FOR 
DETERMINING WHETHER PRIVATE LIFE IS IMPLICATED UNDER ARTICLE 8 
 The preceding sections have demonstrated that whereas the Convention tribunals 
initially defined private life in a piecemeal fashion, and without reference to any general 
framework, some opinions of the Court have now, in the last seven years, floated a trial 
balloon based on a person’s reasonable expectations of privacy.  Although the test is as yet 
underdeveloped in the Court’s jurisprudence, I believe the Court is on the right course and 
that the underdevelopment is understandable at this stage.  In this Part, I propose that the 
Court should embrace such a reasonable-expectations test in all future privacy component 
cases and expand its implementation to include personal choice cases as well.  As such, I 
have tried to re-construct the reasonable-expectations test to include both categories of private 
life.  In the next several sections, I offer a general statement of such a test, suggestions on 
how to correctly frame the applicant’s complaint, and guidelines on how to judge the 
reasonableness of an expectation. 
A. Reasonable Expectations as the Benchmark for Private Life 
 Consider the following proposed statement as the standard to govern future cases in 
which the applicability of private life under Article 8(1) is in question: 
A public authority may not without proper justification under Article 
8(2) interfere with or fail to respect matters in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy or personal choice.  The expectation 
must be judged against what a free and democratic society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable, but without considering, at this Article 
8(1) stage of the analysis, the State’s justifications, motives or goals in 
interfering or choosing not to act. 
B. Framing the Applicant’s Complaint 
 In assessing the reasonableness of a person’s claim that his or her private life has been 
implicated, it is first important to frame the applicant’s purported expectation correctly.  
Although this may seem an obvious point, I raise it because the framing of the expectation is 
more likely in my proposal, than in the Court’s current approach, to affect the outcome of a 
given case.  The key to correctly framing the expectation is to include as many specific and 
salient facts as possible, rather than presenting the issue in a more abstract way.  Too few 
facts may lead the Court to recognize an expectation as reasonable that it should not have or 
reject an expectation that it should have found reasonable.  Aside from the mantra that the 
Court should consider all the relevant circumstances, particular attention should be paid to: 
1. The type, nature, and frequency of the intrusion;105 
2. The location of the intrusion;  
3. The intruder; and 
                                                
105  Such as the type of processing of personal data, as was highlighted in P.G. & J.H., Peck and 
Perry. 
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4. What private or personal-choice matter is allegedly involved. 
 The importance and consequences of factual specificity are best demonstrated by 
example.  Take, for instance, the common situation where a government regulation states that 
when a person brings a lawsuit the case will be assigned to a particular judge and the litigant 
must present all arguments to that judge only, barring some showing of bias or impropriety.  
Now suppose that the litigant challenges this law on the ground that he believes that the 
decision of whom to speak to is a decision that ordinarily would be of personal choice, and 
that therefore the government, by not permitting him to speak and present his case to another 
judge, has interfered with that right.  It seems like an absurd case.  But if the expectation is 
framed without sufficient facts, i.e., by posing it simply as whether it would be reasonable to 
state that it is ordinarily a matter of personal choice to decide whom to speak to and whom not 
to, then the Court would undoubtedly have to find the expectation to be reasonable.  However, 
as more facts are added, e.g., whether it would be reasonable for a person to expect that he 
had the personal choice of deciding which judge to present his arguments to, it becomes less 
likely that the Court would adjudge the expectation to be reasonable.  Of course, it should be 
repeated that the analysis I speak of here relates solely to the applicability of Article 8(1), and 
that a complaint that appears absurd on its face may still be dismissed on the basis of a 
government’s justification under Article 8(2). 
 Factual specificity and careful construction of the issues also are particularly important 
in privacy cases because sometimes, as has been alluded to earlier, reasonable expectations 
can be partial.  “There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of 
privacy,”106 and the rule should not be that in order for an expectation of privacy to be 
reasonable that expectation must be of absolute or complete privacy.107 
 This point was perhaps best demonstrated by the California Supreme Court in its 
decision in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.,108 a case involving the tort of intrusion of 
privacy (a claim that requires as an essential element that the plaintiff have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy).  There, the plaintiffs were injured when their car overturned in an 
accident.  A medical rescue helicopter crew arrived on site, accompanied by a video 
cameraman employed by a television producer.  The cameraman filmed the entire rescue, 
including the nurse and medics’ efforts to care for the accident victims.  Because the producer 
had fitted the rescue nurse with a small microphone, unbeknownst to the victims, he was able 
to record the nurse’s conversation with the plaintiffs.  The video footage was then broadcast 
months later, without the plaintiffs’ permission, on a documentary television show called On 
Scene: Emergency Response (not unlike in the Peck case).109  The plaintiffs sued for intrusion 
of privacy, among other claims. 
 In finding that the plaintiffs could have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
conversations with the rescue personnel,110 the Court held that “mass media videotaping [and 
                                                
106  Sanders v. ABC, 20 Cal. 4th 907, p. 916 (1999). 
107  See id. 
108  18 Cal. 4th 200 (1998). 
109  See id. at p. 209. 
110  And that therefore the issue must be presented to the jury at trial (rather than summarily dismissed 
as the trial court had done). 
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surreptitious recording] may constitute an intrusion even when the events and 
communications recorded were visible and audible to some limited set of observers at the 
time they occurred.”111  The California Supreme Court later explained its holding as follows: 
[We have never stated] that an expectation of privacy, in order to be 
reasonable for purposes of the intrusion tort, must be of absolute or 
complete privacy.  Indeed, . . . a person may reasonably expect 
privacy against the electronic recording of a communication, even 
though he or she had no reasonable expectation as to confidentiality of 
the communication’s contents.  “While one who imparts private 
information risks the betrayal of his confidence by the other party, a 
substantial distinction has been recognized between the secondhand 
repetition of the contents of a conversation and its simultaneous 
dissemination to an unannounced second auditor, whether that auditor 
be a person or a mechanical device.  [¶] . . . [S]uch secret monitoring 
denies the speaker an important aspect of privacy of communication--
the right to control the nature and extent of the firsthand dissemination 
of his statements.”112 
 As I have already recounted elsewhere, the European Court of Human Rights has 
already implicitly accepted such a partial-expectation approach, particularly in the cases 
where the Court focuses on the facts relating to how the matter is processed.  This is the right 
approach, and the Court should ensure that it collects sufficient facts and properly frames the 
applicants’ expectations in future cases to permit it to recognize reasonable, partial 
expectations of privacy.113 
 A final word should also be said about the consequences of correctly framing the 
expectation as involving either the privacy or personal choice components.  Both the parties 
and the Court should be careful in this regard, as the placement of an issue in a particular 
                                                
111  Sanders, supra note 106, at p. 915 (summarizing its holding in Shulman). 
112  Id. (quoting Shulman); see also Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir. 1990) (“We 
agree that there is a difference between a public employee having a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in personal conversations taking place in the workplace and having a reasonable 
expectation that those conversations will not be intercepted by a device which allows them to be 
overheard inside an office in another area of the building. . . .  [¶] . . .  The [workstation] was 
located in an area shared with other workers.  But while Walker might have expected 
conversations uttered in a normal tone of voice to be overheard by those standing nearby, it is 
highly unlikely that he would have expected his conversations to be electronically intercepted and 
monitored in an office in another part of the building.”). 
113  It is interesting to note that had the Court not wanted to recognize a partial expectation of privacy 
in the Peck case, and instead insisted that any expectation of privacy be absolute, it could have 
rejected the applicant’s claim by framing the expectation differently.  Recall that in Peck the 
Court found that private life was implicated where a person was videotaped on a public 
thoroughfare after having attempted suicide and the tape was disseminated and used by the media.  
Had the number of salient facts been reduced, and the question been simply stated as whether a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when engaging in activity on a public street, the 
outcome in Peck would undoubtedly have changed. 
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category may affect the outcome of a case.114  Take, for example, the cases relating to 
transsexuality.  Many of the applicants’ complaints relate to the fact that certain of their 
public records (e.g. birth certificates or driver’s licenses) reflect their old gender status, 
thereby disclosing to the world during ordinary use that the person who appears before them 
as a male must have at one time been a female (or vice versa).  These sorts of cases should be 
presented as privacy expectations.  However, if the case has less to do with the secrecy of the 
gender change and more to do with a person’s status as a transsexual per se, it must instead be 
presented as a personal choice expectation, otherwise the claim will fail.115   
 Another example of this issue in practice may be seen in the following hypothetical.  
Assume a government prohibits individuals from mass-mailing advertisements to the public.  
Aside from the obvious free speech issue, there also may be a claim for governmental 
interference with private life under Article 8(1).116  The claim’s success will depend on how 
the expectation is framed.  Given that it is doubtful anyone could have an expectation of 
privacy as to the mailings themselves given that they were mailed to the public, a private life 
claim based on the privacy component would likely fail.  However, the outcome would likely 
change if one asked whether an individual might reasonably expect that the decision to mail 
the advertisements, and whom to mail them to, would ordinarily be considered a matter of 
personal choice. 
C. Judging the Reasonableness 
 The more difficult question becomes how to take the expectation as framed by the 
parties and the Court, and then judge whether that expectation is reasonable.  I expect this 
area to cause the Court the most trouble.  In my view, the expectation should be judged 
against what a free and democratic society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,117 but 
without considering, at this stage of the analysis, the government’s justifications, motives or 
                                                
114  There may, of course, be cases where an expectation could conceivably be framed and succeed 
under both categories. 
115  Similar distinctions may be drawn in cases involving homosexuality, such as was demonstrated in 
Norris v. Ireland, No. 10581/83[PC], A-142, 13 EHRR 186 (26 Oct. 1988), where the openly gay 
applicant was restricted by laws criminalizing homosexual behavior. 
[T]he interference with privacy involved [there] could not consist of 
activities of the state in disclosing to public view facts which the applicants 
wished to keep secret.  Rather, the Court [held] that respect for private life 
includes respect for the applicants’ sexual life by which, of course, the Court 
must mean a sexual life of the applicants’ own choosing.  Thus, “private” 
must be read to refer not to questions of disclosure or nondisclosure [in this 
case] but the right to choose certain intimate aspects of one’s life, free of 
government regulation. 
 Mark Janis, Richard Kay, and Anthony Bradley, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS p. 278 (2d ed. 2000).  
116  And correspondence, for that matter. 
117  Cf. Katz, supra note 50, at p. 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that, in determining whether a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of a search or seizure conducted by 
law enforcement authorities, the court must inquire whether the individual’s expectation of 
privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  I often shorthand this 
concept by simply referring to a “reasonable person.” 
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goals in interfering or choosing not to act.  Thought of another way, the Court should ask 
itself whether a free and democratic society would tolerate the sort of intrusion the applicant 
has suffered (but, again, without reference to the Government’s purported justifications).  
Two issues bear further elaboration.  The first and most obvious is, how can we judge what a 
free and democratic society would find to be reasonable, and the second relates to why the 
applicability analysis must be undertaken without considering the State’s purported 
justifications.   
1. A Free and Democratic Society 
 Determining what expectations a free and democratic society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable naturally depends on the definition of a free and democratic society, the threshold 
for when an expectation becomes reasonable, and the evidence that may be considered to 
meet that threshold.  I discuss each of these topics in the paragraphs that follow and conclude 
that the Court should consult the practices of the member States--primarily by referring to 
legal instruments and evidence of social customs--and find among them, at a minimum, an 
emerging consensus recognizing the right of privacy or personal choice invoked by the 
applicant.118 
 It should come as no surprise that the definition of a free and democratic society must 
be based in large part by reference to the member States of the Convention.  By virtue of their 
membership in the Convention and the Council of Europe, each of the member States accepts, 
at least in theory, “the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within 
its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”119 Thus, in determining the 
reasonableness of an expectation, the Court should look first and foremost to the practices of 
the contracting governments.  Additionally, the Court may, if necessary (such as where the 
practices of the contracting States are unclear or in conflict), consult the views of non-
member countries that share with Europe “a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, 
freedom and the rule of law.”120  I have in mind countries such as Argentina, Australia, and 
the United States, but there are others as well. 
                                                
118  The task of finding a consensus by reference to European standards is not new to the Court.  As 
part of the Court’s analysis whether to afford a State a margin of appreciation in the State’s 
decision to act or not act in a certain way, the Court often looks to whether there is a consensus or 
common ground among the member States on the issue.  See supra Part I.B.  I have thus, in the 
pages that follow, cited many authorities that discuss consensus in the context of the margin 
appreciation doctrine (at least insofar as I felt them compatible with my proposal).  It nevertheless 
remains important to keep in mind that the goals (and, therefore, consequences) of the consensus 
inquiries differ in each context.  With respect to the margin of appreciation, a finding of 
consensus means the Court will reduce its margin of appreciation, whereas a lack of consensus or 
common ground, in turn, causes the Court to increase the appreciation.  In either case, a consensus 
(or lack thereof) is just one of many factors the Court will consider in analyzing the government’s 
justifications.  It is not, by itself, dispositive.  On the other hand, the purpose of the consensus 
investigation under the reasonable-expectations test is to determine the existence of a right.  Thus, 
whereas the existence of a sufficient consensus means that private life is implicated, the lack of 
sufficient consensus means that the applicant’s claim will fail. 
119  Statute of the Council of Europe Art. 3. 
120  Convention on Human Rights Preamble ¶ 5; see also Kersten Rogge, Fact-Finding in THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS p. 682 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. 
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 It logically follows from our definition of “free and democratic society” that any 
evidence of an emerging consensus should come primarily from sources in or associated with 
the member States and (where necessary) sources in other like-minded countries.  The Court 
should determine the position of each State individually, insofar as possible, and then 
compare the positions of the States to one another.  The two principal factors to consider are: 
1. Legal instruments, including national constitutions, legislation, regulations, case 
law and pending reforms; regional treaties; international treaties; and the case law 
of the Convention institutions; and 
2. Societal norms and customs, as determined by experts, academic literature, 
surveys, or anecdotal evidence.121 
 This sort of comparative, empirical approach (often absent in the cases)122 is necessary 
given that there must be some methodology or evidence upon which the Court “can base the 
stated perception of the common will.  The evolving standards in the Convention should be 
informed by empirical evidence [rather than] simply be plucked from the sky by the judge.”123 
                                                                                                                                                   
Matscher, and H. Petzold eds. 1993) (noting that “some interpretations of Convention guarantees 
also refer to the law and practice of States which, while not parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, nevertheless share the ‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedoms 
and the rule of law’ invoked in the Preamble to this Convention.”). 
121  In some cases, there may be an internal conflict in a State between a legal instrument and societal 
customs, thereby making it difficult for the Court to determine the true position of a member 
State.  Whether to favor the legal instrument over the societal customs should depend on the 
nature and source of the law.  A national law may (1) expressly approve of an expectation, by 
guaranteeing that a person such as the applicant has a right of privacy or person choice in the 
matter at issue, or (2) expressly reject an expectation, by stating or reflecting that the matter is not 
one in which the applicant can have an expectation of privacy or personal choice.  (Of course, the 
most likely scenario, given the factual specificity required to frame the expectations, is that no 
law will speak directly on the issue either way).  If there is a law that guarantees a right of privacy 
or choice in a matter, I would then argue that the law effectively renders within that nation the 
expectation to be reasonable as a matter of law, regardless of other public or expert evidence to 
the contrary.  However, in cases where the law expressly restricts a right of privacy or choice in a 
matter, I would argue that at most it creates a presumption that the expectation is unreasonable in 
that nation, subject to rebuttal by reference to other contrary social customs evidence.  The 
distinction follows from the fact that sometimes, within the national system of a country, it takes 
longer for a State’s legislation to reflect public, societal consensus. 
122  See Rudolf Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS p. 35 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold eds. 
1993) (“A comparative approach seems to be an absolute necessity in order to find common 
European principles in the legal orders of these States.  [¶]  Under these circumstances, it may be 
astonishing that extensive comparative law analyses cannot be found in the judgments of the 
Court or the reports of the Commission.”); Öztürk v. Germany, No. 8544/79[PC], A-73, 6 EHRR 
409 (21 Feb. 1984) (Matscher, J., dissenting) (“In my view, autonomous interpretation would call 
for comparative studies of a far more detailed nature than those carried out so far by the 
Convention institutions.”). 
123  Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism & Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human 
Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 57, pp. 73-74 (1990); see also 
Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
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 I recognize that this task will be difficult and time consuming.  Indeed, commentators 
have lamented that the Court lacks the resources to undertake wide-ranging investigations on 
its own.124  Fortunately, it is doubtful that this sort of investigation will have to occur in every 
case.  Many complaints will invoke expectations already recognized by the Court as involving 
private life, and often the Court will be able to dispose of a case on an alternative basis, such 
as by finding under paragraph 2 of Article 8 that the State’s actions were not in accordance 
with law.  But in cases where the existence or extent of a consensus on private life or personal 
choice will be hotly contested, and the issue cannot be avoided, the solution may be found in 
the Court’s own rules which “are drawn widely to allow the Court considerable scope in 
deciding how to deal with the investigation of the merits of a complaint.”125  The Court should 
make greater use of its rules permitting the use of Court-appointed experts,126 the approval of 
party-requested amicus curiae,127 and the appointment of legal aid.128  It also bears stressing 
that much of the work to be undertaken here should not markedly increase the Court’s 
workload beyond what is already often required under Article 8(2) when determining the 
margin of appreciation to afford a State.  The results of the consensus investigation can thus 
be used as part of both the inquiry into applicability under paragraph 1 of Article 8 and 
governmental justification under paragraph 2.129 
 Defining the threshold for a sufficient common ground is a more difficult issue.  It is 
inevitable that in many cases the evidence will demonstrate diversity among the practices of 
member States.130  Should the Court require a true consensus--i.e., all States (or nearly all) 
must agree that an expectation is reasonable--before the Court can conclude that private life is 
affected?  Or is only an emerging consensus (simple majority) required?  For that matter, is 
only a handful of States enough?  This is a problem that the Court already has encountered in 
the context of Article 8(2) and its application of the margin of appreciation doctrine, and 
                                                                                                                                                   
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR p. 1957 (2002) (“Vague references to 
‘emerging national standards’, which are not empirically verifiable, would undermine [the 
Strasbourg organs’] credibility and sow the seed of suspicion that they are engaged in an 
unfounded judicial activism.”). 
124  See id. at p. 76; Harris, supra note 4, at pp. 11 & 294. 
125  Clements, supra note 5, at p. 66. 
126  See E. Ct. H. R. Rule 42 (stating that the Court “may . . . of its own motion, obtain any evidence 
which it considers capable of providing clarification of the facts of the case[,] . . . decide to hear 
as a witness or expert or in any other capacity any person whose evidence or statements seem 
likely to assist it in the carrying out of its tasks[, or] . . . ask any person or institution of its choice 
to obtain information, express an opinion or make a report on any specific point.”). 
127  See E. Ct. H. R. Rule 61 (stating that the Court “may, in the interests of the proper administration 
of justice, invite or grant leave to any Contracting State which is not a party to the proceedings, or 
any person concerned who is not the applicant, to submit written comments or, in exceptional 
cases, to take part in a hearing.”). 
128  See E. Ct. H. R. Rules 91-96 (stating that Court may in some cases grant free legal aid to the 
applicant). 
129  See supra note 118. 
130  In 1973, Jacques Velu wrote that the “scope of the right to respect for private life depends on 
current manners and custom and varies from place to place, even in Europe.  This explains why it 
is difficult to find a broad definition of this concept in any common legal tradition.”  Velu, supra 
note 22, at p. 34.  One would hope that the member States of the Convention have moved closer 
together in the last thirty years. 
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much can be learned from the cases and literature on this related subject.  Those sources 
demonstrate that although the Court has not expressly adopted an arithmetical threshold,131 the 
Convention tribunals have, beginning with their judgment in Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, 
appeared to embrace at a minimum a majority standard and more often a “great majority” 
standard as the basis for finding a sufficient common ground among the States for purposes of 
determining the level of appreciation.132  This is not surprising, given that it would in a sense 
be an oxymoron to hold that the shared position of only a handful of States is sufficient to 
demonstrate a common ground. 
 Similarly, I think it can be safely said that, in the context of reasonable expectations, 
there should also be at least an emerging consensus (i.e., a simple majority) among those 
States that have taken positions on the subject before the Court may recognize an expectation 
as reasonable.  As Professor Helfer has stated with respect to Article 8(2): 
While it is impossible to specify for every situation a precise formula 
for the number of states that must have [taken a position], at a 
minimum, at least half of the Contracting States should have adopted 
some form of the rights-enhancing measure in question.  This majority 
rule serves as a minimum baseline against which the tribunals can 
judge the emergence of genuinely regional norms.133 
 I question, however, the value in requiring a true consensus before recognizing an 
expectation as reasonable.134  The emerging-consensus standard appears more consistent with 
the principal interpretive canons of the Convention discussed in Part I.B supra.  For one, a 
less rigorous standard makes it easier for the Court to fulfill the principal object and purpose 
of the Convention, namely to promote (and not just maintain) the ideals and values of a free 
and democratic society.135 The Court should not have to wait for decades after a notable trend 
emerges for a true consensus to arrive before it can act.  For similar reasons, the lower 
threshold makes it simpler for the Court to honor its duty to interpret the Convention 
dynamically.  The emerging-consensus standard also seems more consistent with the concept 
of autonomous interpretation.  If the Court must wait until all, or nearly all, States have taken 
a certain position, then has the Court not, in effect, essentially incorporated the position of the 
                                                
131  See Harris, supra note 4, at pp. 295-296 (stating that the “establishment of the existence of a 
European consensus is not an arithmetical exercise of simply adding up the number of states 
participating in the practice, a certain number being sufficient to establish the threshold.”).  
132  See, e.g., Tyrer v. UK, No. 5856/72, ¶ 38, A-26, 2 EHRR 1 (25 Apr. 1978); Marckx, supra note 
12, at ¶ 41; Dudgeon, supra note 45, at ¶ 60; Albert & Le Compte v. Belgium, Nos. 7299/75 and 
7496/76[PC], ¶ 22, A-58, 5 EHRR 533 (10 Feb. 1983); Norris, supra note 115, at ¶ 46; 
Sutherland v. UK, No. 25186/94, ¶ 59, 22 EHRR CD 182 (1 July 1997); L. & V. v. Austria, Nos. 
39392/98 and 39829/98, ¶¶ 47-50, ECHR 2003-I, 36 EHRR 1022 (9 Jan. 2003).  Contra 
Handyside, supra note 16, at ¶ 57. 
133  Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and The European Convention on Human Rights, 26 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, p. 159 (1993). 
134  Cf. Cossey v. UK, No. 10843/84[PC], A-184, § 5.6.3, 13 EHRR 622 (27 Sept. 1990) (Martens, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s use of a “great majority” standard in the margin of appreciation 
doctrine). 
135  See Convention on Human Rights Preamble ¶ 5. 
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States, contrary to its duty to remain autonomous?136  It is for these reasons that it appears that 
an emerging-consensus standard is the better approach for determining whether the Court 
should recognize the existence of a particular right to private life. 
2. Ignoring the State’s Justification When Judging the Applicability of 
Private Life 
 I have left, until now, the discussion of whether a government’s justifications may be 
considered in analyzing whether an expectation is reasonable.  I believe it imperative that any 
use of the reasonable-expectations test be performed without considering the government’s 
justifications, motives or goals in interfering or choosing not to act.  In other words, the 
analysis of private life under Article 8(1) must be kept separate from the justification analysis 
normally undertaken under Article 8(2).137  Take, for example, the case where a child claims 
to have the right to smoke cigarettes at age 13, despite a law outlawing the practice.  Under 
the reasonable-expectations test, we must ask whether a 13-year old child can reasonably 
expect that the decision to smoke or not would be a personal decision for him or her to make.  
But how can one perform the private life analysis without taking into account the likely 
government justification that the law is necessary to protect minors from the harm to health 
caused by smoking?  Admittedly, this may appear conceptually difficult, but the separation is 
possible.  In the hypothetical, for example, the Court might find that most people in a free and 
democratic society would say that a 13-year old has no right to decide whether to smoke or 
not, regardless of the government’s reasons for the restriction. 
 In any event, the analytical separation is required to maintain what I perceive to be a 
balance of interpretation in the Convention between individuals and States.  By virtue of the 
autonomous and “object and purpose” principles of interpretation,138 private life is construed 
broadly in favor of individuals.  Justifications, on the other hand, so long as within the list of 
legitimate aims, are typically construed broadly in favor of the State, courtesy of the margin 
of appreciation.  There is a sense of equilibrium.  To import the justification analysis from 
Article 8(2) (with its margin-of-appreciation baggage) into the Article 8(1) analysis would 
unfairly tip the balance against the very people the Convention was created to protect.  The 
State would often be afforded discretion at two different points in the analysis, thereby 
placing the State at a decidedly unfair advantage. 
 All that having been said, it is important to note that I am not advocating that no 
justification analysis ever occur.  Quite the contrary, it should occur in the normal course of 
events under Article 8(2), after the applicant’s private life has been shown to be affected.  
                                                
136  Cf. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 123, at p. 195 (“An irony of the comparative method is, however, 
that reliance on national practice among the majority of Member States might jeopardize the 
endeavour of the Strasbourg organs to keep the Convention’s standards both autonomous and 
high.”). 
137  In this section, I use the label “Article 8(2)” as a shorthand to include not just the justification 
analysis undertaken in negative obligation cases but also the justification analysis undertaken in 
positive obligation cases. 
138  See the discussion in Parts I.A and I.B supra. 
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D. Relation to Family Life, Home and Correspondence 
 A final issue remains regarding how the reasonable-expectations test should operate vis-
à-vis the other rights recognized in Article 8, such as family life, home, or correspondence.  It 
is not uncommon for an applicant to complain of a violation of private life in conjunction 
with one of these other rights.  And oftentimes the rights overlap, such as where the 
government intercepts a telephone call (correspondence)139 made from the caller’s house 
(home) that concerns personal information (private life) about the caller.  Should the 
reasonable-expectations test be used to judge solely the issue of private life or should it also 
be used to judge all of the other rights contained in Article 8 (including home, family life and 
correspondence)? 
 Unfortunately, the Court’s decisions offer little guidance on how to answer this 
question.  The Court has not always, when reviewing complaints allegedly involving more 
than one Article 8 right, treated those rights separately or explained their relationship to one 
another.140  This occurred, for example, in Halford, wherein the Court was imprecise in 
separating and analyzing Article 8 claims based on private life and correspondence.  Indeed, 
an argument might even be made that the Court intended reasonable expectations to govern 
both private life and correspondence claims.141  Moreover, in some cases the Commission has 
rigidly discussed private life while seemingly ignoring what appears to be an obvious 
violation of the right to respect for home.142  Interestingly, even commentators seem to 
disagree whether the rights should be treated in isolation or melded together.143  In any event, 
there are three possible approaches here: 
                                                
139  Telephone communications are considered a form of correspondence.  See A. v. France, supra 
note 11, at ¶¶ 33-36; Leach, supra note 26, at p. 151 (“[Correspondence under] Article 8 will be 
engaged where there is interference with a wide range of communications, including by post, 
telephone, telex, fax, and e-mail.”). 
140  See Harris, supra note 4, at p. 303 (“Both the Commission and the Court have avoided laying 
down general understandings of what each of the items covers and, in some cases, they have 
utilized the co-terminancy of them to avoid spelling out precisely which is or are implicated when 
an applicant has invoked more than one of them in his claim that there has been a violation of the 
Convention.”); see also Klass v. Germany, No. 5029/71[PC], ¶ 41, A-28, 2 EHRR 214 (6 Sept. 
1978) (failing to separate its discussion of private life and correspondence). 
141  See supra Part II.A. 
142  See, e.g., Artingstoll v. UK, No. 25517/94, 19 EHRR CD 92 (3 Apr. 1995) (holding that a 
regulation prohibiting the keeping of pets in an apartment does not implicate private life, but 
ignoring whether it might implicate the right to respect for home), relying on X. v. Iceland, supra 
note 41. 
143  Compare Doswald-Beck, supra note 22, at p. 284 (“In considering the wording of Article 8, it 
could be said that the right to respect for family life, home and correspondence are all facets of 
private life. . . .  [However,] [i]t is clear from the practice of the Commission and Court that the 
term ‘private life’ is meant to have a meaning of its own, independent of rights relating to family, 
home and correspondence.”), with Ovey, supra note 9, at pp. 217-218 (“[T]he fact that the rights 
in Article 8 are grouped together in the same article strengthens the protection given by that 
article, since each right is reinforced by its context.  Thus, the right to respect for family life, the 
right to privacy, and the right to respect for the home and correspondence may be read together as 
guaranteeing more than the sum of their parts. . . . [¶] It is quite clear, for example, that wire-
tapping, unless it can be justified in a particular case under paragraph (2), is prohibited by Article 
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1. The reasonable-expectations test of private life eliminates the other rights as 
separate, standalone grounds for a claim and is thus the sole method by which to 
demonstrate a violation of Article 8; 
2. The reasonable-expectations test of private life is the conclusive test, but the 
involvement of one or more of the other rights (e.g., home) creates a presumption 
that the applicant’s expectation of privacy or personal choice is reasonable, 
shifting the burden to the Government to prove that there is a consensus to the 
contrary;144 or 
3. Each right under Article 8(1) has its own independent meaning, such that, for 
example, a violation may be found of the right to respect to home, even though 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the activity that took place 
there. 
 Of the three options, the first may be discarded with little discussion.  Quite simply, it 
would be irresponsible and contrary to the intention of the contracting States to render the 
remaining rights superfluous by eliminating them all together.  The second option certainly is 
more appealing; however, the only reason to adopt it would be if one buys into the idea that 
all the rights in Article 8 are interrelated (or related to private life) and cannot be parsed out 
one from the other, as has been argued by some.  But I question whether the presumption 
explanation would even be workable in this context, given that it assumes that the Court 
would normally impose the burden of persuasion on the applicant to prove a consensus, but 
even that is unclear.  I also question whether the results of such an important issue as the 
existence of such a right should depend on the Government’s ability alone to muster the 
necessary evidence of and emerging consensus.   
 The last option obviously is the most straightforward and favorable to applicants, as it 
presents them with four separate ways by which to demonstrate that a right has been 
implicated under Article 8, and appears the most consistent with the goals of the Convention.  
I would therefore be inclined to select the first option.  In any event, this is a matter that the 
Court should clarify in future cases, particularly if adopts the reasonable-expectations test as 
its benchmark for private life.  
                                                                                                                                                   
8, and it matters little whether it is considered an interference with correspondence, or with 
privacy, or even with the home if it takes place there, since these notions should be considered 
together rather than in isolation.”); Marckx, supra note 12, ¶ 31 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting) 
(positing that the various rights of Article 8 are all related to the notion of “domiciliary protection 
of the individual”). 
144  Interestingly, the United States, when presented with a similar issue relating to its use of the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test, has adopted an approach somewhat similar to this one. 
Reasonable-expectations is the determinative test and all of the more specific rights in the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution are not in themselves grounds for a claim that an 
unreasonable search has occurred.  See supra note 50.  However, there is a special proviso that if 
a warrantless search occurs inside a home, there is a presumption that the search violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 I have in the preceding pages proposed a framework by which private life can be 
assessed by asking whether the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy or personal 
choice in the matter involved.  Along the way, I have traced the seeds of such a test in the 
Court’s jurisprudence and highlighted some of the principal issues the Court will come upon 
should it choose to use reasonable expectations as its standard.  Although the Court will likely 
encounter some difficulty in administering the reasonable-expectations test at first, I believe 
those difficulties can be overcome in time as the Court becomes more accustomed to its 
application. 
 So, does the workplace-smoking ban in Levanger, Norway implicate private life under 
Article 8?  That remains to be seen, and I imagine that if the Court ever heard the case that it 
would be one of the tougher ones to decide.  Assuming the Court applied the reasonable-
expectations test, it would want to parse the smoking ban into pieces and consider each of its 
aspects separately--e.g., the applicant’s expectations of personal choice in smoking in the 
office and smoking while on a break outside the office.  I suspect that the Court would find 
the latter expectation to be reasonable without much trouble, but that the former would be 
hotly contested.  In any event, we may soon have some guidance on how the case would come 
out given that the Strasbourg institutions are currently considering a similar issue.145  It will be 
interesting to see if the Court attempts to tackle the matter within the rubric of reasonable 
expectations. 
                                                
145  See Aparicio v. Spain, No. 36150/03 (4 May 2004) (communicating to the State the issue of 
whether a non-smoking prisoner’s private life has been violated by virtue of the fact that there are 
no non-smoking sections in the community areas of the prison and the government has refused to 
ban smoking all together in those areas). 
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